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STRICT GENERICITY
Sy D. Friedman1
M.I.T.
The purpose of this note is to show that unlike for set forcing, an inner model of
a class-generic extension need not itself be a class-generic extension. Our counterex-
ample is of the form L[R], where R is a real both generic over L and constructible
from O#.
Definition 〈M,A〉, M transitive is a ground model if A ⊆ M, M |= ZFC + A Re-
placement andM is the smallest model with this property of ordinal height ORD(M).
G is literally generic over 〈M,A〉 if for some partial -ordering P definable over 〈M,A〉,
G is P -generic over 〈M,A〉 and 〈M [H ], A,H〉 |= ZFC + (A,H)-Replacement for all
P -generic H. S is generic over M if for some A, S is definable over 〈M [G], A,G〉 for
some G which is literally generic over 〈M,A〉, and S is strictly generic over M if we
also require that G is definable over 〈M [S], A, S〉.
The following is a classic application of Boolean-valued forcing and can be found
in Jech [?], page ?.
Proposition 1. If G is P -generic over 〈M,A〉 where P is an element of M,S
definable over 〈M [G], A〉 then S is strictly generic over M.
Proof Sketch. We can assume that P is a complete Boolean algebra inM and that
S ⊆ α for some ordinal α ∈ M. Then H = G ∩ P0 is P0-generic over M, where P0 =
complete subalgebra of P generated by the Boolean values of the sentences “βˆ ∈ σ”,
where β < α and σ is a P -name for S. Then H witnesses the strict genericity of S. ⊣
Now we specialize to the ground model 〈L, φ〉, under the assumption that O# exists.
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2Theorem 2. There is a real R ∈ L[O#] which is generic but not strictly generic
over L.
Our strategy for proving Theorem 2 comes from the following observation.
Proposition 3. If R is a real strictly generic over L then for some L-amenable A,
Sat(L[R]) is definable from R,A, where Sat denotes the Satisfaction relation.
Proof. Suppose that A,G witness that R is strictly generic over L. Let G be P -
generic over 〈L,A〉, P definable over 〈L,A〉, R ∈ L[G], G definable over 〈L[R], A〉.
Also assume that 〈L[H ], A,H〉 |= ZFC + (A,H)-replacement for all P -generic H.
The latter implies that the Truth and Definability Lemmas hold for P -forcing, by a
result of M. Stanley (See Stanley [?] or Friedman[???]). Then we have: L[R] |= ϕ
iff ∃p ∈ G(p  ϕ holds in L[σ]) where σ is a P -name for R and therefore Sat(L[R])
is definable from R, Sat〈L,A〉. As A is L-amenable and O# exists, Sat〈L,A〉 is also
L-amenable. ⊣
Remarks (a) Sat(L[R]) could be replaced by Sat(〈L[R], A〉) in Proposition 3, how-
ever we have no need here for this stronger conclusion. (b) A real violating the
conclusion of Proposition 3 was constructed in Friedman [??], however the real con-
structed there was not generic over L.
Thus to prove Theorem 2 it will suffice to find a generic R ∈ L[O#] such that for
each L-amenable A, Sat(L[R]) is not definable (with parameters) over 〈L[R], A〉. First
we do this not with a real R but with a generic class S, and afterwards indicate how
to obtain R by coding S.
We produce S using the Reverse Easton iteration P = 〈Pα|α ≤ ∞〉, defined as
follows. P0 =trivial forcing and for limit λ ≤ ∞, Easton support is used to define
Pλ (as a direct limit for λ regular, inverse limit otherwise). For singular α, Pα+1 =
Pα∗Q(α) where Q(α) is the trivial forcing and finally for regular α, Pα+1 = Pα ∗Q(α)
where Q(α) is defined as follows: let 〈bγ|γ < α〉 be the L-least partition of the odd
ordinals < α into α-many disjoint pieces of size α and we take a condition in Q(α)
3to be p = 〈p(0), p(1), . . .〉 where for some α(p) < α, p(n) : α(p) −→ 2 for each n.
Extension is defined by: p ≤ q iff α(p) ≥ α(q), p(n) extends q(n) for each n and
q(n+ 1)(γ) = 1, δ ∈ bγ ∩ [α(q), α(p)) −→ p(n)(δ) = 0. Thus if G is Q(α)-generic and
Sn =
⋃
{p(n)|p ∈ G} then Sn+1(γ) = 1 iff Sn(δ) = 0 for sufficiently large δ ∈ bγ .
Now we build a special P -generic G(≤ ∞), definably over L[O#]. The desired
generic but not strictly generic class is S0 =
⋃
{p(0)|p ∈ G(∞)}. We define G(≤ iα)
by induction on A ∈ ORD, where 〈iα|α ∈ ORD〉 is the increasing enumeration of
I ∪ {0}, I = Silver Indiscernibles. G(≤ i0) is trivial and for limit λ ≤ ∞, G(< iλ) =
⋃
{G(< iα)|α < λ}, G(iλ) =
⋃
{G(i2α)|α < λ} (where i∞ =∞).
Suppose that G(≤ iλ) is defined, λ limit or 0, and we wish to define G(≤ iλ+n) for
0 < n < ω. If n is even and G(≤ iλ+n) has been defined then we define G(≤ iλ+n+1)
as follows: G(< iλ+n+1) is the L[O
#]-least generic extending G(≤ iλ+n). To define
G(iλ+n+1) first form the condition p ∈ Q(iλ+n+1) defined by: α(p) = iλ+n + 1,
p(m) ↾ iλ+n = G(iλ+n)(m) =
⋃
{q(m)|q ∈ G(iλ+n)} for all m, p(m)(iλ+n) = 1 iff
m > n. Then G(iλ+n+1) is the L[O
#]-least Q(iλ+n+1)-generic (over L[G(< iλ+n+1)])
containing the condition p. If n is odd and G(≤ iλ+n) has been defined then we
define G(≤ iλ+n+1) as follows: G(< iλ+n+1) is the L[O
#]-least generic extending G(≤
iλ+n). To define G(iλ+n+1), first form the condition p ∈ Q(iλ+n+1) by: α(p) = iλ+n,
p(m)(γ) = G(iλ+n)(m)(γ) for γ 6= iλ+n−1 and p(m)(iλ+n−1) = 0 for all m. Then
G(iλ+n+1) is the L[O
#]-least Q(iλ+n+1)-generic (over L[G(< iλ+n+1)]) containing the
condition p. This completes the definition of G(≤ ∞).
Now for each i ∈ I∪{∞} and n ∈ ω let Sn(i) =
⋃
{p(n)|p ∈ G(i)} and S(i) = S0(i),
S = S(∞). We now proceed to show that S is not strictly-generic over L.
Definition. For X ⊆ ORD, α ∈ ORD and n ∈ ω we say that α is X − Σn stable if
〈Lα[X ], X ∩ α〉 is Σn-elementary in 〈L[X ], X〉. α is X-stable if α is X −Σn stable for
all n.
Lemma 4. For λ limit or 0, n even, Iλ+n+1 is not S-stable.
4Proof. Let i = iλ+n and j = iλ+n+1. Note that Sm(j) is defined from S(j) just as
Sm(∞) is defined from S(∞) = S. But S(j) = S ∩ j and for M > n, Sm(j) 6= Sm(∞)
since i ∈ Sm(j), i /∈ Sm(∞). So j is not S-stable. ⊣
Lemma 5. For L-amenable A ⊆ ORD, iλ+n+1 is (S,A) − Σn stable for sufficiently
large limit λ, all n ∈ ω.
Proof. Let i = iλ+n+1 where λ is large enough to guarantee that i is A-stable.
For p ∈ Pi+1 = Pi ∗ Q(i) and m ∈ ω, we let (p)m be obtained from p by redefining
p(i)(m¯) = φ for m¯ > m and otherwise leaving p unchanged.
Claim. Suppose ϕ is Πm relative to S(i), B where B ⊆ i, B ∈ L. If p ∈ Pi+1, p  ϕ
then (p)m  ϕ.
Proof of Claim. By induction on m ≥ 1. For m = 1, if the conclusion failed then
we could choose q ≤ (p)1, q(< i) ∼ ϕ holds of q(0), B; then clearly (q)0 ∼ ϕ, (q)0
is compatible with p, which contradicts the hypothesis that p  ϕ. Given the result
for m, if the conclusion failed for m + 1 then we could choose q ≤ (p)m+1, q ∼ ϕ.
Now write ∼ ϕ as ∃xψ, ψ Πm and we see that by induction we may assume that
(q)m  ψ(xˆ) for some x. But (q)m, p are compatible and p ∼ ∃xψ, contradiction. ⊣
(Claim.)
Now we prove the lemma. Suppose ϕ is Πn and true of (S(i), A ∩ i). Choose
p ∈ G(≤ i), p  ϕ. Then by the Claim, (p)n  ϕ. As i is A-stable, (p)n  ϕ in
P (≤ ∞). By construction (p)n belongs to G(≤ ∞), in the sense that (p)n (< i) ∈
G(< i) ⊆ G(<∞) and (p)n(i) ∈ G(∞). So ϕ is true of (S,A). ⊣
Theorem 6. S is generic, but not strictly generic, over L.
Proof. By Proposition 3 (which also holds for classes), if S were strictly generic over
L then for some L-amenable A we would have that Sat〈L[S], S〉 would be definable
over 〈L[S], S, A〉. But then for some n, all sufficiently large (S,A)−Σn stables would
5be S-stable, in contradiction to Lemmas 4,5. ⊣
To prove Theorem 2 we must show that an S as in Theorem 6 can be coded by a
real R in such a way as to preserve the properties stated in lemmas 4,5. We must
first refine the above construction:
Theorem 7. Let 〈A(i)|i ∈ I〉 be a sequence such that A(i) is a constructible subset
of i for each i ∈ I. Then there exists S obeying Lemmas 4,5 such that in addition,
A(i) is definable over 〈Li[S], S ∩ i〉 for i ∈ Odd (I) = {iλ+n|λ limit or 0, n odd}.
Proof. We use a slightly different Reverse Easton iteration: Q(α) specifies n(α) ≤ ω
and if n(α) < ω, it also specifies a constructible A(α) ⊆ α; then conditions and
extension are as before, except we now require that if n(α) < ω then for p to extend
q, we must have p(n(α))(2β + 2) = 1 iff β ∈ A(α), for 2β + 2 ∈ [α(q), α(p)). Then if
n(α) < ω, the Q(α)-generic will code A(α) definably (though the complexity of the
definition increases with n(α) < ω).
Now in the construction of G(≤ iα), α ≤ ∞ we proceed as before, with the following
additional specifications: n(iλ+n) = n for odd n and n(iλ+n) = ω for even n (λ limit
or 0). And for odd n we specify A(iλ+n) to be the A(i), i = iλ+n as given in the
hypothesis of the Theorem.
Lemma 4 holds as before; we need a new argument for Lemma 5. Note that for
i ∈ Odd(I) it is no longer the case that P (< i)  Q(i) = Q(∞) ∩ Li[G(< i)]. Let
Q∗(i) denote Q(∞) ∩ Li[G(< i)], i.e., the forcing Q(i) where n(i) has been specified
as ω. Define (p)m as before for p ∈ P (≤ i).
Claim. Suppose m ≤ n+1, n is even, i = iλ+n+1 (λ limit or 0) and ϕ is Πm relative
to S(i), B with parameters, where B ⊆ i, B ∈ L. If p ∈ P (≤ i) (where n(i) = n+ 1)
then p  ϕ in P (≤ i) iff (p)m  ϕ in P
∗(≤ i) = P (< i) ∗Q∗(i) iff p  ϕ in P ∗(≤ i).
Proof. As in the proof of the corresponding Claim in the proof of Lemma 5. If
m = 1 and p  ϕ in P (≤ i), then if the conclusion failed, we could choose q ≤ (p)1
6in P ∗(≤ i), q ∼ ϕ; then (we can assume) (q)0 ∼ ϕ in P (≤ i), but (q)0 and p are
compatible. The other implications are clear, as P (≤ i) ⊆ P ∗(≤ i). Given the result
for m ≤ n, ϕ Πm+1 and p  ϕ in P (≤ i), if the conclusion failed we could choose
q ≤ (p)m+1 in P
∗(≤ i), q ∼ ϕ (indeed, q ∼ ψ(x) some x, where ϕ = ∀xψ, ψΣm);
then q ∼ ϕ in P (≤ i), (q)m ∼ ϕ in P
∗(≤ i), (q)m ∼ ϕ in P (≤ i) by induction.
But (q)m, p are compatible in P (≤ i), using the fact that m ≤ n and q ≤ (p)m+1,
contradiction. And again the other implications follow, as P (≤ i) ⊆ P ∗(≤ i). ⊣
(Claim.)
Now the proof of Lemma 5 proceeds as before, using the new version of the Claim.
⊣
The choice of 〈A(i)|i ∈ I〉 that we have in mind comes from the next Proposition.
Proposition 8. For each n let An = {α| For i < j1 < . . . < jn in I, α < i,
(α, j1 . . . jn) and (i, j1 . . . jn) satisfy the same formulas in L with parameters < α}.
Then any L-amenaable A is ∆1-definable over 〈L,An〉 for some n.
Proof. For each i ∈ I, A∩Li belongs to L and hence is of the form t(i)(~j0(i), i, ~∞(n(i)))
where t(i) is a ∆0-Skolem term for L, ~j0(i) is a finite sequence of indiscernibles < i
and ~∞ (n(i)) is any sequence of indiscernibles > i of length n(i) ∈ ω. By Fodor’s
Theorem and indiscernibility we can assume that t(i) = t, ~j0(i) = ~j0 and n(i) = n
are independent of i. To see that A is ∆1-definable over 〈L,An+1〉 it suffices to show
that for ~i < ~j increasing sequences from An+1 of length n + 1, ~i and ~j satisfy the
same formulas in L with parameters < min (~i). But by definition, for α < min(~i) and
~i = {i0, . . . , in}, ~j = {j0, . . . jn} we get: L |= ϕ(α, j0 . . . jn)←→ ϕ(α, i0, j1 . . . jn)←→
ϕ(α, i0, i1, j2 . . . jn)←→ · · · ←→ ϕ(α, i0, . . . , in). ⊣
Now for i ∈ I write i = iλ+n, λ limit or 0, n ∈ ω and let A(i) = An ∩ i. Thus
by Theorem 7 there is S obeying Lemmas 4,5 such that An ∩ i is definable over
〈Li[S], S ∩ i〉 for i = iλ+n+1, n even.
7Proof of Theorem 2 First observe that as in Friedman [?], we may build G(≤ ∞) to
satisfy Theorem 7 for the preceding choice of 〈A(i)|i ∈ I〉 and in addition preserve the
indiscernibility of Lim I. Then by the technique of Beller-Jensen-Welch [82], Theorem
0.2 we may code (G(<∞), S) by a real R, where S = G0(∞). The resulting R obeys
Lemma 4 because S is definable from R; to obtain Lemma 5 for R we must modify the
coding of (G(< ∞), S) by R in the following way: for inaccessible κ we require that
any coding condition with κ in its domain reduce any dense D ⊆ P<κ = {q|α(q) < κ}
strictly below κ, when D is definable over 〈Lκ[G(<∞), S], G(< κ), S∩κ〉. This extra
requirement does not interfere with the proofs of extendibility, distributivity for the
coding conditions (see Friedman [????]).
Now to obtain Lemma 5 for R argue as follows: Given L-amenable A, choose n and
λ large enough so that A is ∆1-definable from An with parameters < iλ. Then iλ+n+1
is (G(<∞), S, A)−Σn stable. And also A∩ iλ+n+1 is definable over 〈Li[G(< i), S∩ i],
G(< i), S ∩ i〉 where i = iλ+n+1. Thus if ϕ is Πn and true of G(< i), S ∩ i, A ∩ i then
ϕ is forced by some coding condition p ∈ P<i (p in the generic determined by R) and
hence by the (G(<∞), S, A)−Σn stability of i, we get that ϕ is true of G(<∞), S, A.
⊣
We built R as in Theorem 2 by perturbing the indiscernibles. However with extra
care we can in fact obtain indiscernible preservation.
Theorem 9. There is a real R ∈ L[O#] such that R is generic but not strictly
generic over L, L-cofinalities equal L[R]-cofinalities and IR = I.
Proof. Instead of using the iλ+n, n ∈ ω (λ limit or 0) use the i
n
α, n ∈ ω where
inα = least element of An greater than iα. Thus
⋃
{inα|n ∈ ω} = iα+1 and as above
we can construct S to preserve indiscernibles and L-cofinalities and satisfy that no
inα, n odd is S-stable, i
n+1
α is (S,A) − Σn stable for large enough α, n (given any L-
amenable A) and An ∩ i
n+1
α is definable over 〈Li[S], S ∩ i〉 for i = i
n+1
α , n even. Then
code (G(< ∞), S) by a real, preserving indiscernibles and cofinalities, requiring as
8before that for inaccessible κ, any coding condition with κ in its domain reduces dense
D ⊆ p<κ strictly below κ, when D is definable over 〈Lκ[G(< κ), S∩κ], G(< κ), S∩κ〉.
Then for any L-amenable A, in+1α will be (R,A)−Σn stable for sufficiently large α, n.
This implies as before that R is not strictly generic. ⊣
Remark 1. A similar argument shows: For any n ∈ ω there is a real R ∈ L[O#]
which is strictly generic over L, yet G is not Σn〈L[R], R, A〉 whenever R ∈ L[G], G
literally generic over 〈L,A〉. Thus there is a strict hierarchy within strict genericity,
given by the level of definability of the literally generic G from the strictly generic
real.
Remark 2. The nongeneric real R constructed in Friedman [??] is strictly generic
over some L[S] wher R /∈ L[S]. The same is true of the real R constructed here to
satisfy Theorem 2. This leads to:
Questions (a) Is there a real R ∈ L[O#], R not strictly generic over any L[S], R /∈
L[S]? (b) Suppose R is strictly generic over L[S], S generic over L. Then is R generic
over L?
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